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The U.S. Navy has placed doctrinal emphasis on space-based capabilities as a 
key enabler of naval operations since 1959. But the service has not provided the 
associated organizational focus necessary to develop an educated, experienced, 
and qualified professional space cadre. Despite this management shortcoming, 
the Navy remains critically reliant on capabilities provided by space-based assets 
and has continued to exploit these capabilities. 
This thesis critically reviews the current Navy Space Cadre and recent 
trends affecting its future. The origin of the cadre, management of its billet base, 
professional development of members, and future structure are examined. While 
the Navy Space Cadre meets minimum requirements set forth in Department of 
Defense and Department of the Navy directives, this study finds the effectiveness 
of the cadre is reduced due to a poor understanding of future requirements, an 
underdeveloped training and education progression, a non-standardized 
approach to operational unit support, and an undefined career path for cadre 
members. Recommendations are presented to improve the effectiveness without 
a wholesale restructuring of the community. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Navy has long been interested in the study and exploitation of space-
related capabilities. Navigation by the stars was key to open ocean operations 
and led to the establishment of the Naval Observatory in Washington, DC in 
1830.1 From this beginning, the Navy steered a course through rocketry 
expertise and upper atmosphere probes in the decade following World War II2 to 
the successful launch in 1958 of the nation’s second satellite under the Vanguard 
program.3 These scientific research missions were key to both the nation’s space 
program and the development of Navy space expertise. Science and exploration 
were not the only motivations. The Navy focused on operational requirements 
specific to its own mission set. In 1959, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations 
(VCNO) Vice Admiral John Hayward approved nine Navy operational 
requirements for space systems. Recognizing parallels among these 
requirements and those of the Air Force and Army, the VCNO set the Navy’s 
policy to ”support vigorously, by funding and otherwise, all of the operational 
requirements that are unique to the Navy, and to participate fully in the 
development of [all] those operational requirements which have Naval 
applications.”4 Hayward’s requirements and supporting policy would prove to be 
the themes and methods of the Navy’s space program over its next 60 years. 
How well the Navy performed in each would clearly indicate the effectiveness of 
the Navy space program.  
In modern warfare, space assets provide critical capabilities such as 
communications and intelligence. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
said, “Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations 
                                            
1 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars: A Chronicle of the U.S. Navy’s Space 
and Space-Related Activities, 1944–2009, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2010): 8, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/books/space/FromTheSeaToTheStars-2010ed.pdf. 
2 Ibid., 8–10. 
3 Ibid., 16–17. 
4 Ibid., 22. 
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without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to 
space and cyberspace.”5 The Navy’s reliance on space can be understood in the 
nature of its operations. Free of land-based infrastructure, the Navy is critically 
reliant on space systems to conduct operations in the most effective manner. In 
the Naval Operating Concept 2010 (NOC 2010), the sea service chiefs describe 
how the naval forces will accomplish the objectives set forth in A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Space-based capabilities are integral 
throughout NOC 2010 as a key enabler to successful naval operations.6 But 
doctrinal emphasis on space capabilities supporting naval operations is not 
enough to ensure organizational focus through commitment of funds and 
personnel. The Navy’s role in space significantly diminished following the end of 
the Cold War, despite continued dependence on space-based assets.7 The 
personnel and organizations required to adequately convey the Navy’s needs 
were recognized in the 1994 Navy space policy, but funds to match the relative 
significance of space were not forthcoming.8 The 2003 assignment as Executive 
Agent for Space to the Air Force provided a framework for Navy participation in 
joint programs, though its direct role in acquisitions and operations continued to 
diminish.9 
The Naval Space Handbook states there has been an “increasing focus 
on re-invigorating Navy Space” in recent years.10 In 2009, the Information 
Dominance Corps (IDC) was formed, joining together the 
                                            
5 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, Cyber Power 2020, 
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21
st
 Century Defense (Washington, DC: Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, 2012), Title Page, http://www.defense 
innovationmarketplace.mil/resources/NavyCyberPlan2012.pdf.  
6 Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Commandant of the Coast 
Guard, Naval Operating Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Chief of Naval Operations, 2010), http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf. 
7 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 141. 
8 Ibid., 143. 
9 Naval Network Warfare Command, Naval Space Handbook (Virginia Beach, VA: Naval 
Network Warfare Command, 2013), 8.  
10 Ibid. 
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Meteorology/Oceanography (METOC), Information Warfare (IW), Information 
Professional (IP), Intelligence, and Navy Space Cadre (NSC) communities.11 
Operationally, the transformation of cyberspace into a fifth domain of warfare and 
the increased focus on information operations makes the information-focused 
IDC communities logical partners in modern warfare. While the IDC formation did 
little to change NSC development and management, it did assign an advocate for 
space. 
The formation of the IDC resulted in a flurry of doctrine and strategy 
documents. By 2013, the IDC had released a vision document, a roadmap for the 
future of information dominance, a strategy document, and a human capital 
strategy. In all of these foundational documents, space plays an integral part to 
Navy information operations. Common themes exist across the 2012–2013 
documents: focus on Navy involvement in broader acquisition and operations 
processes, advocacy for Navy-unique requirements addressed by space-based 
assets, conduct of space-related science and technology (S&T) and research 
and development (R&D), and emphasis on operational application of space-
based capabilities. Is this more of the same or is it truly a step toward a deeper 
role for Navy space?  
To accompany the doctrinal emphasis on space, the new space type 
commander (TYCOM), Navy Cyber Forces (NCF), conducted a zero-based 
review (ZBR) of the NSC workforce in 2012, releasing the report in February 
2013.12 The Navy Space Plan Task Force was also formed in 2012 to “codify 
those actions that Navy personnel must be ready and able to fulfill to ensure we 
                                            
11 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, Navy Strategy for Achieving 
Information Dominance, 2013-2017: Optimizing the Navy’s Primacy in the Maritime and 
Information Domains (Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information 
Dominance, 2012): 5, http://www.public.navy.mil/fcc-
c10f/Strategies/Navy_Strategy_for_Achieving_Information_Dominance.pdf. 
12 Navy Cyber Forces Command, Navy Space Cadre Workforce Zero-Based Review 
(Suffolk, VA: Navy Cyber Forces Command, 2013). 
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have what is necessary to operate effectively in any environment.”13 While the 
effects of these efforts cannot yet be said to have re-invigorated Navy space, 
there is certainly much going on in terms of Navy space management and 
doctrine development.  
The organizational focus of the NSC is an important indicator of how 
effectively doctrinal emphases will be implemented. This thesis critically reviews 
the NSC, focusing on the processes currently in place to address the 
management of officer billets and professional development of NSC members. 
Primary documents from Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of 
the Navy (DON), and Navy subordinate communities are examined, as well as 
recent theses from Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students. Rather than 
exploring alternative structures for the NSC, this work focuses on the NSC that 
exists today and proposes changes to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Due to the dynamic state of the current NSC, this study cannot provide thorough 
investigation of the NSC billet base and its management. The changes in the 
billet base and the method of managing it are addressed and recommendations 
for future work are presented.  
                                            
13 Sandy Daniels, “Information Dominance and the Navy Space Plan,” Information 




II. THE NAVY LEGACY IN SPACE: HISTORY OF NAVY 
PARTICIPATION IN EARLY SPACE PROGRAMS 
A discussion of American military space efforts can begin with a list of 
Navy firsts. Navy research and development activities in the 1950s and 1960s 
included the first operational space communications, the first satellite tracking 
system, the first satellite navigation system, the first electronic intelligence 
(ELINT) satellite, and the first American in space.14 These activities gave the 
Navy a lead role in early U.S. space explorations. Key Navy leaders, including 
Admiral Arleigh Burke, recognized the importance of space capabilities to Navy 
operations and began discussing the exploitation of space as one of the 
operational functions of Navy staffs.15 Research by the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) and Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory 
(APL) led to Navy-developed systems providing space force enhancement (SFE) 
through intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR), satellite 
communications (SATCOM), position, navigation, and timing (PNT), and 
environmental monitoring systems. 
VCNO Hayward’s recognition of parallel requirements across the services 
was a harbinger of future DOD policy.16 As the military space program lagged 
Soviet efforts, the need for coordination and unity of effort led to the 1961 
designation of the Air Force as the lead service for developing and acquiring 
space systems.17 This limitation to the Navy’s role was the first of several 
reductions in the Navy’s organizational focus on space. After each diminishment, 
                                            
14 National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on the Navy’s Needs in 
Space for Providing Future Capabilities, Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities 
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), 20–21. 
15 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 62. 
16 Ibid., 21–22. 
17 Ibid., 39. 
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the Navy never recovered its past national space leadership, though its 
dependence on and effective exploitation of space continued to grow.18  
A. NAVY INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. SPACE 
PROGRAM 
Following World War II, Army and Navy researchers divided captured 
German V-2 rocket components to rebuild V-2 rockets and eventually develop 
the first American rockets.19 The Navy began launching space probes on V-2 
rockets in 1946, including from the deck of USS Midway (CVB-41) in 1947.20 But 
the dwindling supply of V-2 rockets motivated the Navy to develop its own 
rockets. The Aerobee and Viking, would form a solid foundation on which the 
Navy would build its strategically important space program.  
The Applied Physics Laboratory developed the smaller Aerobee rocket 
using Navy funding. The Aerobee was capable of lifting 150 pounds of payload to 
an altitude of 75 miles and doing so at 35,000 miles per hour, higher and faster 
than its contemporary, the Army’s Wac Corporal rocket.21 The Aerobee would 
serve not only Navy programs but all three service branches before the program 
was discontinued.22 NRL developed the Viking rocket from the V-2 design, 
successfully launching in 1949.23 It would later serve as the basis for the 
Vanguard launch vehicle.  
In 1950, a group of international scientists proposed an international 
geophysical year (IGY) for 1957–1958. In 1955, President Eisenhower 
announced that the United States would launch artificial satellites during the IGY. 
The Soviet Union followed suit and announced in 1957 its intention to launch 
                                            
18 Ibid., 114–115. 
19 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 8. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
21 Ibid, 11–12. 
22 Air University, AU-18: Space Primer (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 
2009), 7, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/space/au-18-2009/au-18-2009.pdf.  
23 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 11. 
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satellites.24 The U.S. military services each presented proposals for the IGY 
satellite, hoping for a piece of the growing space budget pie. The Army and Air 
Force presented proposals for Project Orbiter and Project World Series, 
respectively, using launch vehicles based on ballistic missile technology.25 The 
NRL presented Project Vanguard, launched on a modified Viking rocket. In 
keeping with the scientific focus of the IGY, Project Vanguard and its modified 
Viking rocket were selected as the U.S entrant.26  
On 4 October 1957, the Soviets successfully launched into orbit the 
world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik.27 In response, the first U.S. satellite was 
placed atop the Vanguard rocket in December 1957, despite concerns over the 
program’s readiness.28 The resulting launch failure prompted President 
Eisenhower to approve launch of the Explorer-I (formerly, the Army’s Project 
Orbiter) atop the Juno launch vehicle (a modified version of the Army’s Jupiter 
rocket) in January 1958.29 Project Vanguard successfully launched in March 
1958, making it the nation’s second artificial satellite.30  
President Eisenhower believed strongly in the peaceful use of space as a 
means to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union.31 The need for a civilian 
agency to control the research and development of space systems and shape 
the future of the space program led to the creation of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) in October 1958, which acquired the 
necessary resources and authority to administer and control the national space 
                                            
24 Ibid., 15. 
25 Ibid., 16. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Air University, Space Primer, 8. 
29 Ibid., 8–9. 
30 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 17. 
31 Ibid., 18. 
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program in a matter of a few years.32 While the structure and organization of 
civilian control over civilian space programs was solidifying, the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was formed as a DOD space agency in 
1957.33 ARPA’s role was to eliminate unnecessary competition and duplication of 
effort amongst the military services by controlling the funding for all space 
projects.34 Although short lived and largely ineffective, the existence of ARPA did 
present a challenge to program development that the Navy would effectively 
overcome. 
B. NAVY PARTICIPATION IN EARLY SPACE MISSION AREAS 
Navy researchers at NRL and APL provided proof of concept for a variety 
of capabilities and developed operational systems providing SATCOM, ISR, 
PNT, and environmental monitoring space force enhancement. These systems 
supported operations of the Navy and other services and provided groundwork 
for future joint programs. 
1. Satellite Communications 
In 1948, two NRL scientists working on capture of Soviet RADAR signals 
began investigating the collection of radio signals reflected off the moon.35 
Project PAMOR (Passive Moon Relay) represented the beginning of SATCOM 
and ELINT collection from space for the Navy. From the classified PAMOR work, 
an operational program, the Communications Moon Relay (CMR) System, was 
begun in 1956.36 When it went operational in 1960, the relay was used to 
transmit teletype and facsimiles to Hawaii, as well as from shore-to-ship.37 The 
                                            
32 Air University, Space Primer, 10. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 19. 
35 Ibid., 12. 
36 Ibid., 23. 
37 Ibid., 23. 
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only limitation to the system was the availability of the moon itself. For reliable 
and available communications, a constellation of satellites would be needed.  
Following CMR, the Navy partnered with NASA, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, and Bell Laboratories in a passive communications relay project 
named Echo-I.38 A 100-ft reflective, self-inflating balloon was launched to an 
altitude of 1000 miles in 1960. It was tested successfully and used by stations in 
the United States and abroad.39 At the same time Echo-I was in development, 
ARPA disapproved Navy’s proposal for a store-and-forward communications 
satellite. Navy participated in joint programs for active SATCOM in the late 1950s 
until 1961.40 In 1961, an even more restrictive environment precluded Navy-
acquired systems, forcing the Navy to rely on other services and commercial 
systems.41 
In the 1970s, fleet SATCOM requirements dictated use of small, largely 
omnidirectional antennas for aircraft and smaller ships. The Navy proposed an 
ultra-high frequency (UHF) SATCOM system to meet these requirements. The 
proposal was approved and the Navy was given overall responsibility for the UHF 
system, named Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM).42 Navy’s 
leadership in UHF SATCOM continues today, as it fields the next generation 
system known as the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS).43  
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
Passive collection of Soviet radio signals through Project PAMOR required 
high-gain antennas. The NRL’s newly built Stump Neck antenna (measuring 220 
feet by 263 feet) in Maryland proved unreliable in receiving the weakened 
                                            
38 Ibid., 28. 
39 Ibid., 29. 
40 Ibid., 29–30. 
41 Ibid., 45. 
42 Ibid., 78. 
43 Ibid., 175. 
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signals, leading to the design of a 600-ft steerable antenna in West Virginia.44 
Such was the size of the antenna required to capture the signals at the desired 
reliability and fidelity. The cost of the antenna proved too high, however. For 
roughly 20 times less money, an NRL-designed ELINT satellite could collect 
Soviet signals from space.45 The West Virginia project was cancelled and Project 
Tattletale was formed..  
Researchers at NRL began to consider using a submarine ELINT receiver 
onboard a satellite in 1958. The receiver was sensitive enough to detect radio 
signals hundreds of miles away.46 If the receiver could be placed high enough, it 
could intercept Soviet signals from far within the borders. By summer 1959, the 
project had achieved presidential approval and ARPA funds: Project Tattletale 
was born. A leaked report in the New York Times threatened the program’s 
continuation, but it survived under a new name, DYNO.47 The ELINT project was 
a highly classified, interagency program between the services, the National 
Security Agency (NSA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Operating 
under the cover name GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background) and carrying 
unclassified sensors in addition to its classified payload, the DYNO/GRAB 
program was a tremendous success and allowed detection of Soviet signals far 
beyond previous limitations.48  
In 1962, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) was organized and 
absorbed the DYNO program under the name Poppy. The NRO continued to 
operate the Poppy series of ELINT satellites until the mid-1970s as one of the 
national technical means (NTM) systems.49  
                                            
44 Ibid., 13. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 30. 
47 Ibid., 32–33. 
48 Ibid., 31. 
49 Ibid., 54. 
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3. Position, Navigation, Timing  
When Sputnik was launched in 1957, Dr. William Guier of APL found 
inspiration. He accurately calculated the orbit of the Soviet satellite using a 
mechanical calculator, the Doppler shift of the satellite’s signal, and the 
estimated time on top of Washington (broadcast by Soviet radio and discovered 
by Guier’s colleague, George Weiffenbach).50 Using a new digital computer and 
a single tracking station, the duo was able to track and conduct experiments on 
the signals from Sputnik II and Explorer-I more accurately than anyone at the 
time.51 Dr. Frank McClure, Guier’s and Weiffenbach’s boss, suggested that if the 
station could determine the orbit, the location of the station could be determined 
from the orbit. Over the course of the next week, McClure and another APL 
researcher designed a navigation system. The first space-based navigation 
system, Transit, was proposed in spring 1958.52 
The innovative beginning of the Transit system was not limited to its 
design. As the development of military space systems was the responsibility of 
ARPA, Navy officials leveraged concerns over Polaris missile accuracy to secure 
funding and support for the Transit system.53 The world’s first on-orbit navigation 
system began testing in 1959 and was operational in the mid-1960s.54 The Navy 
continued to operate the system until 1996, when the transition to the multi-
service Global Positioning System (GPS) was complete.55  
4. Environmental Monitoring 
In an effort to understand the impact of the ionosphere on radio 
communications, NRL and Navy-sponsored APL began launching space probes 
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on its cache of German V-2 rockets and its own Viking and Aerobee rockets.56 
Satellites presented a much greater opportunity for science and discovery, 
providing access to multiple orbits and longer periods of time in the environment 
than the short-lived space probes. NRL began the SolRAD program in 1960, 
gathering data on solar radiation.57 In support of the Transit program, APL 
conducted important geodesy and magnetosphere research.58 The Navy’s 
primary emphasis in environmental monitoring was scientific. Operationally, the 
Navy partnered with other agencies, relying on military and civil systems for 
weather exploitation, including the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) TIROS system and the Air Force Defense Meteorological 
Satellite Program (DMSP).  
5. Space Situational Awareness 
In support of Vanguard, the Navy built the Minitrack system, including a 
“fence” of ground stations from Maryland to Chile.59 These passive stations relied 
on signals sent from a satellite. In order to track satellites and other space 
objects not emitting predictable signals, active antennas were required to track 
targets passing overhead. The Navy built the Space Surveillance System (Space 
Fence) from 1958 to 1961. The Space Fence included three transmitter and six 
receiver stations along the 33.5-degree parallel.60 The active ground stations 
illuminated targets overhead and the receiving stations received the reflections, 
collecting data on orbiting objects. The Navy operated the Space Fence until it 
was transferred to the Air Force in 2004.61 It continued to be an integral part of 
the nation’s SSA capabilities until its closure in 2013. 
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C. OPERATIONAL LEGACY 
VCNO Hayward issued nine naval requirements for space systems in 
September 1959. His list included seven requirements that are core capabilities 
of ISR, environmental monitoring, SATCOM, and PNT space force enhancement 
operations.62 These requirements flowed from the work the scientific community 
was performing (what was possible) and the problem set the Navy encountered 
on a daily basis (what was needed). Not surprisingly, the need for space force 
enhancement capabilities through ISR, environmental monitoring, SATCOM, and 
PNT was not unique to the Navy. The Army and Air Force would have similar 
requirements for space systems. Hayward set forth Navy policy acknowledging 
these parallels in requirements, pledging vigorous support for Navy-specific 
requirements and full participation in development of systems that supported 
naval requirements by other services or processes.63 These requirements and 
policy statements were made during ARPA’s control of defense space funding, 
so the statement was likely made out of necessity to accomplish objectives. But 
the operational requirements and policy model proved to be a blueprint for the 
Navy’s future work in space and is one of the true legacies of Navy space. 
The Navy continued to support operational requirements through system 
development efforts and scientific research work despite challenges such as the 
ARPA control of funds in the late 1950s. Where a restrictive environment limited 
control of development, Navy space provided fleet support by exploiting other 
systems such as DSMP and national systems through the Tactical Exploitation of 
National Capabilities (TENCAP) office.64 TENCAP, in particular, provided a 
particularly good opportunity for operationally savvy Navy personnel to leverage 
national technical means capabilities. These initiatives focused on providing the  
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information to the warfighter and the required SATCOM terminal development, 
conducting ship overhaul for receipt of data, and performing other functional 
changes to enhance fleet exploitation of space capabilities.65 
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke in 1959 recognized the 
need for space expertise for operational commanders. His memo stated: 
I think it is time for each of the Fleet Commanders…to have a 
Space Section in their Staffs whose main function would be to 
ensure that the commands are fully cognizant of all Space activities 
and their influence upon war planning, readiness, et cetera. The 
initial staff sections need not be more than one officer but that 
officer should be very good and should be thoroughly briefed before 
he takes the job [emphasis added].66 
Like VADM Hayward’s requirements and policy statements later in the 
same year, ADM Burke’s view of the need for space knowledge at the 
operational level was an indicator of the future of the Navy space mission. 
Though the role of a space section never truly settled in on operational staffs in 
the Navy, the function of space force enhancement has been incorporated, 
primarily in the Intelligence (N2) and Communications (N6) directorates. This 
operational fleet focus on the exploitation of space systems led these Navy 
operators to remain in their communities. The largely unorganized Navy space 
experts at NRL, APL, and the Naval Observatory were scientists and engineers, 
not Navy operators.67  
D. CHALLENGES TO NAVY LEADERSHIP IN SPACE 
The Navy had an innovative approach to space in the early years of the 
program, presenting creative solutions to real problems. These solutions 
provided a basis for the Navy’s strong participation in space. Broader decisions 
within the DOD and government would present challenges to the Navy’s role in 
developing and operating space systems. 
                                            
65 Ibid., 39–62. 
66 Ibid., 62. 
67 Ibid., 62. 
 15 
The Eisenhower administration formed ARPA in 1957 as a method to limit 
replication of efforts across the military services. The new agency held the purse 
strings for all military space programs and complicated the development and 
acquisitions process for the individual services.68 But the Navy continued its 
development efforts, tactfully securing funding for programs such as Transit and 
DYNO. As NASA was growing as a civil agency for space, operational programs 
were transferred to the fledgling organization. The Navy’s Vanguard program and 
Viking rockets were transferred, along with more than 200 NRL personnel 
working in the programs.69 Navy officers also filled many early astronaut billets in 
NASA’s manned spaceflight program.70 The Navy would lose the experience and 
expertise of most of these personnel.  
In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy administration saw a need for a single 
focal point within DOD space. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara issued a 
directive assigning sole responsibility for development and acquisition of military 
space systems to the Air Force.71 The directive presented new barriers to active 
Navy participation in development and acquisition of space systems and 
subordinated fulfillment of Navy requirements to those of the Air Force.72 Also in 
the 1960s, the formation of the NRO consolidated the Navy’s ELINT DYNO 
program into Program C as Poppy.73 These systems continued to support the 
operational requirements of the fleet and the nation and the Navy retained the 
experience gained from operating and acquiring these systems through its 
participation in the NRO. 
In a similar way, multi-service programs such as GPS brought operational 
capability to the fleet without the responsibility of developing and acquiring the 
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system. The challenge existed in the ability of the Navy to convey its operational 
requirements to the developing agency and for the system to meet the 
operational needs. Simply sending requirements to the Air Force was not 
sufficient to ensure fulfillment of the requirements. In the 1990s, Navy space 
advocates recognized the need to participate in the entire development process, 
from beginning to end, to achieve Navy-specific requirements while still operating 
the systems it was responsible to develop and operate.74 Advocates for Navy’s 
active role in space argued that continuation of the Navy’s legacy of active 
participation and exploitation of available space systems was integral to its future 
success. In 2005, the Committee on the Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing 
Future Capabilities recommended the Navy “fully support and exploit the ongoing 
transformation of the Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence community” 
in order to become “an even more effective and relevant force within the DOD.”75 
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III. FORMALIZATION OF THE SPACE CADRE 
The Navy space team began as an ad hoc group of expert scientists and 
engineers at NRL, APL, and the Naval Observatory. These professionals sought 
innovative solutions to problems and afforded the Navy the opportunity to lead 
several early space force enhancement operations for the military. The cost of 
space systems and the need to eliminate duplication of effort forced DOD to 
consolidate development and acquisition processes at different times. The most 
recent of these consolidations was particularly critical to the management of 
space professionals and forced the formation and eventual evolution of the DOD 
Space Cadre. 
A. 2001 SPACE COMMISSION 
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, DOD space 
shifted from a strategic focus to supporting the warfighter. The confluence of 
international events in the early 1990s heightened the importance of this shift. 
When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the superpower counterweight to the U.S. 
military was gone as well. Military spending declined, and space systems were 
on the block as they were largely considered strategic in nature.76 However, in 
the same year, Operation Desert Storm highlighted the importance of space 
capabilities to achieving overwhelming military advantage at the tactical level. 
The capabilities of space systems in support of tactical military operations 
became a primary focus of Navy and national space policy over the next 
decade.77 
The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization (Space Commission) was chartered in 1999 and 
released its report in January 2001. Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld and chartered 
to assess military space, a merger of IC and non-IC space systems, space in 
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professional military education (PME), and service solutions for national security 
space, the commission presented an urgent and cautionary tenor in terms of the 
leadership and security of national security space.78 The report highlighted the 
importance of space to the national security of the United States and recognized 
the dependence of government agencies, including the military services, on 
capabilities delivered by space systems.79 The report recommended a series of 
changes to the organization and management of national security space in part 
because a similar level of organizational focus did not accompany the doctrinal 
emphasis on space capabilities. The report states, “Our growing dependence on 
space, our vulnerabilities in space and the burgeoning opportunities from space 
are simply not reflected in the present institutional arrangements.”80  
The commission made 16 recommendations, including 13 actions for the 
DOD.81 Based on the report, the Air Force would be assigned the lead role in 
DOD space, acting as Executive Agent for Space (EAS) in charge of acquisition 
of military space systems.82 The Army and Navy would retain their abilities to 
develop, acquire, and operate space systems necessary for their own missions, 
but the Air Force was seen as the best bridge to a dedicated national security 
space service in the future.83 A qualified cadre of space professionals would thus 
be required in the Army and Navy to ensure their ability to collect and submit 
requirements, develop and operate unique space systems as required, and 
continue to perform S&T and R&D. Research and development endeavors by the 
Army and Navy were recommended not only for their obvious benefit but also to 
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assist in the maintenance of a sufficiently experienced space cadre.84 Accepting 
budgetary constraints as inevitable, the report recommended renewed innovation 
combined with unity of effort by research organizations. The report 
recommended a research organization be created to oversee and prioritize this 
research initiative and that Air Force Space Command be responsible for funding 
research, development, acquisition, and operations. 85 
Following the Space Commission, Rumsfeld became Secretary of 
Defense and implemented 10 of the 13 DOD recommendations.86 The focus on 
space activity by the new Defense Secretary and research coordinated by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the services 
sparked an increase in space activity in the Navy (and all services).87 But the Air 
Force’s primacy as space leader was evident as it was assigned the role of 
EAS.88 The Navy slowly adapted to the new construct and its role in a formalized 
DOD space cadre. In 2005, the National Research Council identified that “[t]he 
Navy’s needs in space can be satisfied by focusing on the support elements: 
requirements, acquisition, science and technology, experimentation, and 
personnel.”89 This was the intent of the changes: that the Army and Navy support 
the joint programs with personnel and requirements input. The GAO assessed 
the services’ efforts and provided critiques of the Navy’s attempts to create the 
NSC.  
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B. NAVY SPACE CADRE 
Although the Navy saw a decline in its space activities following the Cold 
War, the Navy still holds key acquisition and operational responsibility, primarily 
for narrowband SATCOM systems. Navy operations still depend on space 
capabilities, so requirements must be met and therefore conveyed. Unique 
requirements that cannot be met through joint programs must be researched and 
solutions developed. The Navy historically maintained a loose ad hoc group of 
space professionals. After the Space Commission and subsequent DOD 
directives, the military services were required to “[d]evelop, maintain, and 
manage a sufficient cadre of space-qualified personnel to support their DOD 
Component in space planning, programming, acquisition, and operations.”90 
1. Navy Space Cadre Formalization (2003–2010) 
The DOD space cadre was slow to start department wide. In the 2002 and 
2003 GAO assessments, critiques focused on the lack of a DOD human capital 
strategy and changes within the Air Force. After the 2003 assignment of EAS to 
the Air Force91 and the completion of the DOD space cadre human capital 
strategy in 2004, the focus of the GAO turned to the Army and Navy. The 
oversight of the GAO was a positive force for the Navy, forcing formalization of its 
space cadre through a series of reviews. 
Although the NSC was technically formed in July 2003, it was not until 
April 2004 that the Secretary of the Navy issued the Department of the Navy 
Space Policy (Naval Space Policy), directing the Navy and Marine Corps to 
develop and maintain a space cadre.92 The CNO provided specific Navy 
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guidance in May 2005 with the Navy Space Policy Implementation instruction.93 
Navy policy was to recruit, educate, qualify, and retain a professional space 
cadre in order to exploit current systems and influence future system design.94 
The NSC would include active duty and reserve officers and enlisted, as well as 
civilians.95 It identified Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) as the 
TYCOM and functional authority for space.96 The Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Manpower and Personnel was directed to designate a Space 
Cadre Advisor that would act as a “virtual community manager for the Space 
Cadre.”97 As originally defined in 2002, the Space Cadre Advisor role had little 
official responsibility and a divided chain of command,98 which the 2004 GAO 
report criticized.99 The redefined Space Cadre Advisor met focal point concerns 
of the 2004 GAO report. 
The 2004 GAO report also criticized the Navy for the lack of a human 
capital strategy for its space cadre. Without a strategy, the NSC did not have 
clearly defined goals and objectives.100 To address these concerns, the Navy 
completed its NSC human capital strategy in January 2005. The strategy 
identified the dependence of the Navy on space primarily as a domain through 
which information flows. The report highlighted the need for operational 
commanders to be aware of the capabilities and limitations of space assets in 
order to optimize their exploitation today and their availability and effectiveness in 
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the future.101 The Navy identified members of the NSC by flagging individuals 
with space experience and education within each of the communities, but leaving 
the officers in the original communities. The strategy provided a defense of this 
structure,  
By grooming talented, educated, and operationally proven people 
to assume key decision making positions in space, the Space 
Cadre cross-designator community enables warfighters to succeed 
across the spectrum of conflict.102  
The mission of the NSC was to provide qualified personnel to support 
assessments, requirements, S&T/R&D, acquisition, and operational roles in order 
to “influence the design of future systems to solve Naval warfighting gaps, and to 
maximize the capabilities of today’s space systems…”103 At the time of the 
report, the NSC had nearly 547 members identified across the active duty officer 
corps and 250 space billets across Navy, joint, and DOD commands.104 The 
cross-community structure of the virtual community and small size highlighted the 
need to retain and reassign NSC members to future space jobs. While 
developing new NSC members was as simple as detailing an officer to a space-
funded billet, promoting the members was a different story. Unfortunately, many 
officers viewed space jobs as career killers and promotion boards tended to 
agree. The strategy identified promotion rate, not recruiting, to be a significant 
challenge to maintaining end-strength.105 To mitigate the stigma, the strategy 
identified the importance of providing specific information to promotion boards to 
highlight assignment to space jobs as career enhancing, thus ensuring NSC 
members promoted at community-average levels.106  
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The strategy identified five goals to ensure the NSC fulfilled the Naval 
space policy and the Navy’s implementation plan:  
 Optimize the force structure in order to meet Fleet acquisition and 
operational requirements  
 Align the Space Cadre with CNO goals, the Navy’s overall HCS, 
Sea Power 21, and Joint Vision 2020  
 Craft the training and education of the Space Cadre to ensure that 
the labor force contains the right skill sets to meet future manning 
needs  
 Provide incentives, advancement opportunities, meaningful 
mission-relevant work, opportunity to compete for key jobs, and  
 Gain senior leadership support throughout the Navy107  
The strategy also identified challenges, gaps, and barriers to an effective 
NSC. Challenges included several concerns regarding civilian inclusion in the 
NSC, ranging from a need to capture the civilian billet base to a single skill set 
stigma that exists in the civilian workforce.108 Significant attention was given to 
the cross-community sourcing of the NSC. With accession pathways limited to 
assignment to a graduate education program in space systems or assignment to 
a space-coded billet, the NSC had little control over the officers that would 
become members of the NSC. It also had no say in the other communities’ 
reduction in commitment to space-coded billets. Once an officer was coded as a 
member of the NSC, there was concern that promotion boards would not value 
space assignments as highly as other assignments.109 
The strategy identified gaps that existed and inhibited the NSC from 
meeting its potential. Some method of tracking civilian, reserve, and enlisted 
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corps, critical billets were not identified, a development track was not designated, 
and career paths were not defined. These gaps prevented shaping the NSC 
workforce for the future.110 
Ultimately, the NSC human capital strategy was a first step toward a 
coherent, effective virtual community. If the Navy could effectively implement 
recommendations to mitigate challenges, barriers, and gaps identified in the 
strategy, the NSC could become a model for success. Nearly a decade after the 
human capital strategy was developed, however, many of the same challenges 
and gaps still exist. The failure to act to resolve these identified problems would 
be a common theme in the new NSC. 
2. Navy Space Cadre within Information Dominance Corps 
In June 2009, the CNO ordered the Director of Naval Intelligence (N2) to 
act as lead in a realignment of the office of the CNO (OPNAV). The 
memorandum recognizes that modern operations “demand a whole-warfighting 
approach” throughout the operational and tactical levels.111 The reorganization 
was deemed necessary in order to achieve dominance “across the full spectrum 
of operations at sea, under the sea, in the air, in the littorals, and in the 
cyberspace and information domains.”112 The resulting reorganization merged 
the N2 and N6 directorates into a combined N2/N6 office. The reorganization 
brought together the information-related communities of IW, Intelligence, IP, 
METOC, and the NSC, forming the IDC.113  
The IDC began disseminating guidance and policy almost immediately. 
The Deputy CNO for Information Dominance (DCNO N2/N6) issued a 
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memorandum to the IDC in 2009, providing an overview of the forthcoming 
documents. The IDC strategic plan centered on issuance of a strategic roadmap 
followed by specific “sub-roadmaps” in specific mission areas.114 These first 
documents did not directly reflect ownership of the NSC, nor did they suggest 
space would be an integral part of the IDC. In May 2010, the IDC issued its vision 
for Information Dominance. The vision followed the CNO guidance that 
information dominance would be a core capability of the Navy. It sought to define 
the “new niche Navy will fill at the intersection of maritime, information, and 
cyberspace domains.”115 A common theme throughout the vision is eliminating 
“stove-piped solutions that benefit only a single element.”116 The cost of these 
inefficiencies is too expensive to continue, particularly in the current fiscal 
environment. The vision depicts interconnected networks, sensors, and 
processes, extending beyond the technical realm and into the professional 
development scheme. Cross-training and cross-qualification are key components 
of the plan to strengthen the IDC. The plan with regards to space and the NSC, 
however, maintained status quo. While space-capability exploitation was implied 
in discussions of command and control networks, netted sensors, and 
electromagnetic spectrum management, the only direct mention of space 
capabilities envisions a future with an “integrated space-based earth observation 
remote sensing plan” that extends across interagency requirements and includes 
NTM capabilities.117 
3. Professional Development 
The Navy Space Cadre historically was defined in an ad hoc manner. 
There was no coherent plan to grow members. The formation of the Space 
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Systems curricula at NPS in 1982 introduced a formal program to educate space-
savvy officers to return to fleet operational billets and engineers to fill acquisition 
billets in joint and Navy programs.118 Following the formation of the NSC, the 
Space Systems Operations (SSO) and space systems engineering (SSE) 
curricula from NPS were the only formal accession source for members.119 
Officers in the SSO curriculum earned the 6206 subspecialty code (SSP), while 
SSE graduates earned the 5500 SSP. The SSP was qualified with a letter code 
suffix (see Table 1). 
 
Suffix Meaning 
S One experience tour 
R Multiple experience tours 
P Master’s degree 
Q Master’s degree with experience 
Table 1.   Subspecialty code suffix.120 
Officers with SSO masters’ of science (MS) degrees from NPS were 
assigned the 6206P SSP. These officers were immediately incorporated into the 
NSC. Officers could also earn an SSP appended with the S or R suffix by 
assignment to a billet coded with the associated SSP.121  
The formation of the IDC introduced the Information Dominance Warfare 
Officer (IDWO) qualification and associated Personnel Qualification Standard 
(PQS). The IDWO qualification process started with in-community qualification 
(e.g., intelligence) and concluded with completion of the IDWO PQS, which 
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provided a core of cross-community training in the form of level 100 and 200 line 
items.122 Completion of the IDWO PQS was initially optional for members of the 
NSC because a Space Cadre PQS was not yet published.123 In December 2010, 
the NSC issued its PQS and the IDC revised the IDWO qualification process to 
permit NSC members to qualify as IDWOs.124 Completion of the Space Cadre 
PQS and IDWO qualification were ancillary to SSP and did not gain entrance into 
the NSC. Management changes announced in 2012 would drastically change the 
accession of NSC members. 
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IV. CURRENT NAVY SPACE TRENDS 
Space featured in early IDC documents as a key enabler of successful 
operations. In essence, this was a statement of status quo to the space 
community: the Navy has used space and will continue to do so. In 2012, the 
tenor began to change. In the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information 
Dominance, information is presented not only as an enabler of effective modern 
warfare, but also as a warfare domain, a weapon, a threat, and a vulnerability.125 
In this context, space (and the other disciplines of the IDC) is a key domain of 
warfare, one that commanders must consider in planning operations and fighting 
battles. This paradigm shift may provide the impetus for organizational focus on 
the NSC that space advocates have been requesting for years.  
A. CURRENT NAVY SPACE POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
In 2004, the Secretary of the Navy released the most recent departmental 
space policy. As previously mentioned, the policy requires a professional space 
cadre to fully exploit available space systems and to shape future designs.126 
This high-level document provides DON policy to align with DOD policies issued 
from 1999 to 2003 and reflects the Air Force assignment as EAS.127 It does not 
reflect more recent focus on asymmetric threats to space capabilities, nor the 
concept of space as a domain for warfare. While the policy is in need of revision, 
it clearly outlines the need to partner beyond DON to fully integrate space 
capabilities in Marine Corps and Navy operations and for qualified personnel to 
complete the task. The policy is set for a revision some time in 2014.128 
The most recent CNO Navy space policy implementation instruction is 
similarly outdated. It also reflects the role of space capabilities in modern Navy 
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operations and requires the maintenance of a space cadre, including officer, 
enlisted, and civilian personnel.129 More significant than what the implementation 
plan contains is what it does not. The plan does not reflect the OPNAV N2/N6 
merger and formation of the IDC. The entities assigned duties and 
responsibilities have all changed, meaning the specific actions are misdirected. 
This implementation plan is also set for revision, pending release of the DON 
space policy.130 
The Navy Space Strategy of 2008 reflects a much more complete picture 
of space, including the importance of both exploiting available capabilities and 
protecting assets from threats.131 The strategy seeks to continue to exploit 
available assets and to shape future systems by “vigorously engag[ing] with key 
national and joint space-related entities” in order to participate more effectively in 
development processes.132 It presents five long-term goals: 
 Mitigate impact of threats to critical capabilities. 
 Identify, prioritize, and advocate Navy-specific requirements. 
 Posture the NSC to be the Navy space requirements advocate. 
 Conduct Navy-focused space S&T/R&D. 
 Engage senior space leadership.133 
The Navy space strategy action plan provides specific actions to 
accomplish strategic goals. In 2008, specific objectives for posturing the NSC for 
its advocacy role included identifying NSC critical billets; completing a zero-
based review of space billets; instituting space billets at maritime headquarters 
with standing maritime operations centers (MOCs) and on strike group staffs; 
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identify and designate civilian members of NSC; update and recruit reserve NSC 
members; and monitor and improve payback tour rates for officers graduating 
from SSO/SSE programs at NPS.134 The plan does not include an objective to 
include enlisted members in the NSC. While most objectives remain outstanding, 
a zero-based review (ZBR) of Navy space billets was completed in 2012 by the 
new TYCOM, NCF, and represented a major step forward for many of the 
objectives. The ZBR report will be discussed in detail below. 
An updated Navy space strategy was released in 2011, but it is essentially 
a copy of the 2008 version, sharing the same five goals.135 The Fleet Space 
Effects Warfighting Concept of Operations (Fleet Space CONOPS), released in 
November 2012, refers to the 2008 strategy as the most recent version.136 
Furthermore, the space strategy is not often referenced in the Fleet Space 
CONOPS or elsewhere, no matter the year released. 
The Fleet Space CONOPS itself is a mid-term document that seeks to 
provide “enhancements to the mission capability of Fleets/Maritime Operation 
Centers, Strike Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups and U.S. Naval vessels.”137 
Space mission areas, key Navy space organizations, and space weather are 
discussed as a sort of space operations crash course. The CONOPS presents 
several operational scenarios as examples to the warfighter of the current space-
operating environment, particularly threats and vulnerabilities of space-based 
assets. It also describes operational planning of space capabilities, identifying 
joint entities relevant to space operations in-theater, such as the Director of 
space forces (DS4) on the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) 
staff. The NNWC Space Cell coordinates space support for maritime units, but 
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cannot fully accomplish the task for all customers. Carrier strike groups (CSGs), 
amphibious ready groups (ARGs), and other deployed units must make contact 
with the theater DS4 staff via a space operations officer in order to receive 
optimal support.138 Independent deploying units, such as ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) destroyers, are also directed to utilize the space operations officer role in 
gaining proper space support.139 The CONOPS, in some ways, is one half of the 
essential knowledge for a new space operations officer.  
The other half of the essential knowledge is the Naval Space Handbook, a 
desk reference guide for space operations. The handbook starts with a space 
fundamentals chapter, in order to prepare the “new Space Operations Officer 
with a basic understanding of the space environment, space systems, space 
supporting organizations, doctrine and policy.”140 It describes tools that are 
available for use, points of contact for support, checklists for deployment, and 
links to relevant sites on the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) 
and Joint Worldwide IC System (JWICS). The handbook truly provides the core 
knowledge for a space operations officer. In combination with the Fleet Space 
CONOPS, it appears the Navy has a series of documents to inform an otherwise 
unprepared space operations officer and the broader Navy community. 
B. 2012 AQD RESTRUCTURE 
Since the formal beginnings of the space cadre in 2002–2003, graduate 
education from NPS was the primary on-ramp to NSC membership as indicated 
through P and Q suffixed SSPs. In addition to the SSP, the Navy uses additional 
qualification designators (AQDs) to track qualified personnel and to code billets 
with required qualifications. The NSC originally had four AQDs for its members.  
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These AQDs, described below by the Navy space human capital strategy, valued 
graduate education in combination with greater than 18 months experience 
above all else: 
 VS1 (Recruit) = Officer who has received a Space Certificate from 
the Naval Postgraduate School or an equivalent institution. 
 VS2 (Apprentice) = Officer who has a space-related bachelor’s 
degree from an accredited institution or has 18 or more months of 
experience in a space-related billet. 
 VS3 (Journeyman) = Officer who has a space-related master’s 
degree from an accredited institution, has proven experience (more 
than one tour of 18 or more months of experience) in a space-
related billet; or a space-related bachelor’s degree from an 
accredited institution plus 18 or more months of experience in a 
space-related billet. 
 VS4 (Expert) = Officer who has a space-related masters or 
doctorate degree from an accredited institution and has proven 
experience of at least 18 months in a space-related billet.141 
The Naval War College has described the Navy culture as one that learns 
on the job.142 The Navy puts emphasis on operational billets and encourages 
completion of graduate education through distance learning by placing neutral 
value on in-residence education opportunities in selection boards.143 The Navy, 
then, does not generally require graduate education to become a subject matter 
expert in a given field. In addition, many officers are unable to fit NPS curricula 
into their career progressions. Accordingly, in 2013, the Navy announced an 
AQD restructure that deemphasized graduate education and better represented 
the desired qualities of the space cadre.144 The NSC replaced the VS1–VS4  
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AQDs with an operations branch (VS5 through VS8) and an acquisition branch 
(VR1 through VR3). Table 2 presents the new AQD structure and associated 
training requirements. 
 




VS5     1 
VS6     2 
VS7     4 
VS8     6 
VR1    I 2 
VR2    II 4 
VR3    III 6 
Table 2.   NSC AQD structure following 2013 revision.145 
As a candidate for NSC accession, space operations officers report to a 
VS5-coded billet as a non-NSC member. Once in the position, the officer 
completes the Space PQS and completes one year in the space-related billet 
before applying for the VS5 AQD. In order to progress through the operations 
(VS5–VS8) AQDs, the officer must complete follow-on training requirements tied 
to VS6, VS7, and VS8 billets. The training requirements center around courses 
offered at the Air Force’s National Security Space Institute (NSSI). Space 200 is 
an intermediate course designed for mid-career space professionals.146 For VS6 
billets, the Space Warfighter Prep Course (SWPC) is an alternate to the Space 
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200 course. It is designed specifically for operational personnel working to 
effectively employ space-based assets in exercise and real-world operations. 
New space acquisition professionals report to a VR1-coded billet as a 
non-NSC member, as well. Once completing the Space PQS, two years of space 
acquisition experience, and acquisition-specific certification, the officer can apply 
for the VR1 AQD. Acquisition-specific training is accomplished through Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification. Space acquisition 
professionals are required to complete higher levels of DAWIA certification as 
they progress through the AQDs. DAWIA certification curricula are focused 
training for acquisition personnel in order to improve effectiveness of defense 
acquisition programs.147 Certification requirements for the 14 career fields are 
divided into acquisition training, functional training, education, and experience 
areas. Each career field has differing requirements in each area. For example, 
level I certification in program management, a common function for military 
acquisition professionals, requires one year experience plus one fundamentals of 
acquisition course, an introduction to earned value management, a cost analysis 
course, and a fundamentals of systems planning, research, development, and 
engineering course.148 These certification requirements do not capture specific 
space education or training, only acquisition and related material. But space 
acquisition professionals complete DAWIA certification in lieu of space education 
requirements for VR1 VR3 AQDs. A space VR1-candidate must complete the 
Space PQS, DAWIA level I certification, and two years of space experience prior 
to applying for the VR1 AQD.149 
On the surface, the addition of the space acquisition branch to the NSC 
AQD structure appears to provide additional depth to the ability to track NSC 
personnel. But the operations–acquisition split was already present in the 
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categorization of the NSC: the SSP 6206 implied space operations while 5500 
denoted space acquisition. In addition to the graduate education requirement, the 
Navy used S and R suffixed SSPs to indicate the experience gained (or desired) 
for a specific billet. The SSP is not adaptable enough to capture training 
requirements, however; it only captures graduate education (masters or 
certificate) or experience. The AQD provides greater refinement as it is able to 
capture training requirements and additional levels of experience. In addition, the 
NSC requires applications to be submitted for each AQD, allowing it to verify the 
completion of requirements prior to awarding the new AQD.150 The revised AQD 
structure provides a clearer picture of the true experience and NSSI education 
level of NSC members, while P and Q suffixed SSPs continue to track 
completion of graduate education.  
C. ZERO-BASED REVIEW 
In 2012, Navy Cyber Forces conducted a zero-based review of space 
billets in order to establish a manpower baseline and to inform the Navy Space 
Plan Task Force.151 The study included officer, enlisted, and civilian positions 
and sought to validate the requirements for space-coded billets. The ZBR 
considered 1,144 total billets, validating 980 of those as space-related.152 The 
report recommended changes to be implemented in the NSC manpower billet 
base, including a sweeping overhaul of AQDs and SSPs, assigned.153 
The work began with a formal definition of the NSC: 
The Navy Space Cadre is the total force that provides leadership 
and technical expertise to develop, evaluate, acquire, operate, and 
exploit space capabilities in order to meet the full spectrum of Naval 
and Joint warfighting requirements.154 
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The definition goes on to say the NSC includes active duty component 
(AD) and reserve component (RC) Navy members (officer and enlisted) and 
DON civilians, but it does not include personnel who simply use space 
capabilities (e.g., SATCOM terminal operators).155 A workforce construct was 
then developed, adding operational and tactical focus to a cadre structure that 
was primarily acquisition and policy focused.156 After pulling data for 930 billets 
that include space-coding or space-related duties in titles, the ZBR validated 
billets using input from the owning commands. The commands responded with 
an additional 214 space-related billets and provided input for non-space related 
billets, resulting in the removal of 164 billets. The final validated NSC manpower 
requirement was determined to be 980 billets across military (officer and enlisted) 
and civilian (government and contractor) positions.157 Table 3 shows the 
breakdown of billets (one billet of the 980 total is unaccounted for). The ZBR also 
presented a breakdown by AQD across AD and RC officer billets (see Figure 1).  
The ZBR validated SSP-coding for billets, as well. Each command 
provided input for billets that required MS education. These billets were coded 
with P or Q suffixed SSPs, as appropriate for current requirements. The 
experience-based (S and R suffixed) SSPs were removed and those billets were 
given appropriate VS or VR AQDs. The resulting billet base did not make a 
significant change to the number of billets requiring MS education. The combined 
effect of the AQD revision and the ZBR validation is a billet base not focused on 
graduate education as a primary accession source, but with validated 6206/5500 
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Type Billets 
Officer (AD and RC) 358 
Enlisted (AD and RC) 266 
Civilian (government and contractor) 355 
Table 3.   ZBR billet breakdown.158 
 
 
Figure 1.  AD and RC officer billets by AQD.159 
During validation of the billets, the ZBR did not address critical billets 
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not validated. The review validated 45 of 78 critical billets as space-related. The 
remaining 33 billets were cut as not space-related. The ZBR did not consider 
whether or not the 214 added billets were critical.160 
The method of validating billets deserves a closer inspection. When the 
ZBR collected data and sent it to the owning commands, it expected input on 
what space-related billets were needed for current operations. The quality of the 
input depended on the knowledge and understanding of the submitting entity. But 
the ZBR received less than optimal feedback from more than one command. In 
one instance, a command declined its previously assigned NSC billet because it 
is assigned a space task only when needed, not daily.161 The ZBR did resolve 
this discrepancy and included this billet as a validated billet, but the event 
highlights the possibility of poor input. Furthermore, the input from units not 
familiar with space-related tasking (e.g., strike groups) is particularly suspect 
given the lack of understanding of space operations. Yet, the ZBR included these 
inputs with the same weight as inputs from long-standing units such as the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Space Field Activity 
(SSFA). The validated requirements were then bundled together as the 
recommended billet base and forwarded to the Navy Space Plan Task Force. 
As a result of the input process, billets added across operational units 
(e.g., CSGs) were not standardized. Each CSG and Amphibious Squadron 
(CPR) commander was allowed individual input for the CSG/CPR in order to 
maintain “the commander’s prerogative to assign these duties as he/she sees 
fit.”162 But in the same paragraph the ZBR identifies an inability to provide a 
complete listing of CSG/CPR space operations billets “due to lack of response 
from some of the units.”163 Despite this discontinuity, the report recommends 
continuing tailored space operations billet coding on each CSG/CPR staff despite 
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the lack of understanding of space operations and the lack of response.164 These 
problems are not isolated to CSGs/CPRs, but extend to numbered fleets (e.g. 
Fifth Fleet). 
Navy Cyber Forces began to implement its billet base changes in 2013, 
beginning with a shift to the revised AQD structure. The AQD change for 
personnel was not a one-for-one exchange but required reapplication by each 
member no later than the November 2013 deadline.165 As a result of the change, 
the NSC went from 1033 AD and RC officers in 2011166 to 124 members in 
February 2014.167 NCF also continued to improve its billet base following the 
release of the ZBR report. The current billet list awaiting full implementation 
includes 382 AD and RC billets.168 A breakdown of AD and RC officer 
recommended billets is included in Table 4.  
 
Type Billets 
AD Officer 296 
RC Officer 86 
Total 382 
Table 4.   NCF implemented billets.169 
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The AQD breakdown for all billets is shown in Figure 2 and reflects 
changes to VS5, VS7, and VS8 billet numbers. The updated billet list is now 62 
percent operations (VS5–VS8; 236 billets) and 38 percent space acquisition 
(VR1–VR3; 145 billets). (There is one billet for a professor at the U.S. Naval 
Academy, which is coded with the PROF AQD. This billet is not included in 
further discussions.) Space acquisition billets represent a larger percentage of 
AD officer billets (43 percent; see Figures 3 and 4). Previously, the acquisition–
operations billet split was much closer to 50 percent for AD officer billets, so the 
ZBR billet base clearly represents added investment in space operations.170  
 
 
Figure 2.  AD and RC billets by AQD.171 
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Figure 3.  Overall officer billets by AQD type.172 
 
Figure 4.  AD officer billets by AQD type.173 
The added operations billets are mostly coded as shore duty, however. 
The ZBR found that 99 percent of space-related billets are shore-based.174 The 
addition of space operations billets on afloat staffs has increased the total sea-
based billets to 10, representing 3.5 percent of total AD officer billets and 6.3 
                                            
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Navy Cyber Forces Command, Space Zero-Based Review, 11. 
 43 
percent total AD officer VS billets.175 The sea-based billets are on CSG and CPR 
staffs, as well as one billet on Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F) staff.176 There 
are nine additional billets on CSG, CPR, or expeditionary strike group (ESG) 
staffs that are not coded as sea-based billets.  
Overall, the ZBR report and recommended billet base provides a clear 
snapshot of the current NSC billet base while the revised AQD structure provides 
an improved (and more accurate) categorization of NSC members. The billet 
base not only captures currently filled requirements, but also provides a 
recommended base of what should be filled. These manpower requirements 
remain focused on the here and now, however. The NSC needs to know the 
future requirements in order to properly posture its personnel to achieve those 
requirements. The Navy Space Plan Task Force was chartered to consider this 
and other topics related to the future of Navy space.  
D. NAVY SPACE PLAN TASK FORCE AND EXPECTED DOCUMENTS 
In April 2012, DCNO N2/N6, VADM Card, appointed Rear Admiral Sandy 
Daniels as Senior Advisor for Space and to chair of the Navy Space Plan Task 
Force.177 The task force was chartered “to develop, design, and produce the 
Navy Space Plan to assess the Navy’s space workforce requirements, 
capabilities and capacity, as well as the Navy’s role in space.”178 The ZBR report 
and associated billet base are the starting point for the task force, which will 
analyze gaps and present a plan to “create a sustainable Navy Space 
workforce.”179 The charter also identifies the future report of the task force as the 
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Navy’s input to the biennial report to Congress on DOD space cadre 
management.180 Thus, the task force is tasked with presenting the current status 
of NSC management, the vision and requirements for Navy space moving 
forward, and the plan to connect the present to the future.  
A recent draft of the upcoming Navy Space Plan shows the task force’s 
focus areas are the space requirements process, space-related S&T/R&D, space 
acquisition, operational support, and the NSC.181 The task force recommends the 
implementation of the ZBR billet base in order to address inconsistencies and 
current gaps that exist across the fleet.182 While the plan recognizes budget 
constraints as a barrier to rapid change in Navy space functions and roles, it 
makes several recommendations to improve efficiency and effectiveness. In the 
S&T/R&D focus area, the task force recommends more efficient S&T/R&D 
processes, focused by a funding strategy, that translate successful S&T 
endeavors into requirements for future systems.183 In order to effectively 
advocate for solutions to Navy requirements gaps, the plan recommends 
establishing and maintaining senior positions at key Air Force and joint 
commands.184 Though the plan calls for maintenance of acquisition billets at 
current (ZBR-recommended) levels, it does recommend further investigation of 
assuming responsibility for a future space-based weather system.185 The 
operational support section highlights the need for experience through exercises 
in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments.186 
The task force is critical of the NSC. It found that members “sometimes 
lack the formal training and/or skills required to fill key space-related 
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positions.”187 Sometimes the shortfalls are due to a lack of formal training 
processes and other times the NSC member with the required skill set is not 
assigned to the priority position. In addition, the plan identifies the lack of formal 
tracking processes for civilian and enlisted members. In order to better posture 
the NSC, the task force recommends 15 actions, which include: 
 Formalize NSC training. 
 Update the space cadre human capital strategy, including for 
enlisted and civilian members. 
 Implement ZBR-recommended billet base. 
 Standardize coding of space operations officers on afloat staffs. 
 Track enlisted NSC billets. 
 Track civilian NSC billets. 
 Require training en route during permanent change of station 
(PCS). 
 Prioritize NSC billets.188 
The Navy Space Plan will ultimately inform the development of an updated 
Navy space action plan, Navy space strategy, and NSC human capital strategy 
during 2014.189 These documents, in concert with implementation of the ZBR 
billet base, may implement changes advocates have championed since the 
current DOD space cadre and space management structure was formed 
following the Space Commission. The work is not complete, however, and 
several areas deserve closer inspection and specific recommendations. 
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The current trends in Navy space doctrine and policy as well as NSC 
management are encouraging. The Navy Space Plan Task Force is taking an 
important role in recommending NSC changes to build a more effective and 
streamlined cadre. The task force must focus attention on the vision of the future 
NSC, current and future manpower requirements, and professional development 
of the NSC to be effective. 
A. MANPOWER ANALYSIS 
1. ZBR Billet Base Implementation 
Navy Cyber Forces, the NSC TYCOM, currently has developed a draft 
package for submission to Navy Manpower Analysis Center (NAVMAC) for the 
revised billet base. According to CDR Dejesus at NCF, current funding limitations 
are preventing full implementation.190 In order to transition, funds must be made 
available to cover the costs of the training requirements for VS6, VS7, and VS8. 
While the quotas at NSSI are available, the funding is not yet solidified. In the 
interim, the billets are being managed through SSPs, as before. According to the 
OPNAV NSC status brief, there are currently 140 billets in the NSC.191 While the 
billets are in this state of limbo, the effectiveness of the NSC is significantly 
limited.  
2. Non-Standardized Billets on Operational Staffs  
The ZBR-recommended billet base offers an increased investment on 
afloat staffs. Unfortunately, these billets are not standardized. All nine active 
CSGs have billets in the draft billet list. However, the specific billets include six 
IW billets, one command and control billet, one mine warfare billet, one METOC 
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billet, and one communications billet.192 CSG-8 has two space billets, one each 
for IW and mine warfare. All three active ESGs have space-coded billets, 
including two IW billets and one METOC billet.193 Billets are standardized across 
the CPRs, with all seven commanders assigning space operations to an IW 
billet.194 The lack of standardization is likely an indication of who is currently in 
the position as opposed to who should be assigned the duty. Although the 
preponderance of space operations billets are assigned to IW officers, the lack of 
standardization not only indicates lack of a consistent manpower strategy, but 
also requires individual tailoring of strike group training prior to deployment. This 
is an unnecessary complication. 
While the assignment of the NSC billets across operational staffs is not 
standardized across staff functional offices, there is consistent AQD 
standardization. The CSGs are assigned VS6 billets, with CSG-8 assigned a 
VS5-level officer along with the VS6 billet. The ESGs and CPRs are assigned 
VS5 billets. The geographic numbered fleets (except the omitted C5F) are 
assigned VS7 billets, though C6F has a VS6 billet in addition to the VS7-level 
officer. The C10F billets are broader, ranging from VS5 to VS8. 
Fleet Space CONOPS instructs all deploying units to utilize space reach-
back support through a space operations officer.195 But individual ships will not 
have space operations officers assigned under the ZBR-recommended billet 
base. For an independently deploying destroyer (DDG) or frigate (FFG), reach-
back support through NNWC or theater DS4 is the most effective and directed 
avenue for space support coordination.196 In not standardizing staff support 
across the fleet, space support for these individual deploying units is left to 
chance that there is an officer with space experience onboard. A candidate for 
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theater space support is the numbered fleet headquarters, with associated 
MOCs. Five of six numbered fleets or the associated Navy regional command 
include space operations billets in the recommended billet base. The notable 
omission is Fifth Fleet/Naval Forces Central Command (C5F/NAVCENT). It is 
clear that operational support for deployed units is not yet standardize nor well 
defined. 
The Navy has discussed how to integrate space operations since ADM 
Burke’s comments in 1959. Even today, 55 years later, the Navy has not fully 
integrated space operations on afloat staffs. This could be a reflection of the 
general static nature of space operations. Despite the tremendous speeds 
involved with orbiting satellites, “flying” the spacecraft is a fairly static operation 
due to well-determined orbits and relatively few changes to numbers of on-orbit 
objects on a daily basis.197 This aspect of space operations has not changed 
tremendously since the 1960s. In addition, the afloat staffs were not directly 
involved in operating or tasking the space systems. Instead, the operational 
commander was concerned with what capabilities were available to the fleet for 
exploitation, which were similarly static. Only when new assets were launched or 
on-orbit assets suffered failures did these capabilities change. 
Today, space operations are changing from operations enabled from 
space to operations in space. Emerging threats to on-orbit assets as well as 
threats to end-user terminals force commanders to be updated more frequently 
on available capabilities. Maneuvers in space may become more frequent as a 
means to protect satellites from adversary-based threats such as anti-satellite 
weapons and unintended threats such as the increasing numbers of orbital 
debris. The dynamic capability may be necessary to maintain space (and 
information) superiority in a denied or degraded environment.198 While satellite 
operators will require more sensors and data in order to increase the pace of 
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satellite maneuvers, operational commanders must be aware of current 
capabilities and limitations of systems in order to make battlefield decisions. This 
requires a space operations function, which is what the author believes ADM 
Burke was referring to when he said commanders had to remain “fully cognizant 
of the rapidly changing Space Picture.”199  
3. Future Requirements 
In 2004, the NSC human capital strategy identified the inability to 
determine future manpower requirements as a gap limiting the effectiveness of 
the NSC.200 This still appears to be the case a decade later. The ZBR did not 
address future requirements of the NSC, but did a tremendous job improving the 
current billet base. That impressive task must not be allowed to be the final 
result. The Navy Space Plan Task Force is left to identify gaps in the ZBR-
recommended billet base by analyzing the billets in terms of the future 
requirements for the NSC. But the task force is also assigned the task of defining 
the future role of Navy space.201 The task force must address the future of Navy 
space honestly and resist the urge to set strictly achievable requirements. Only 
by knowing what the Navy wants to achieve with its future space professionals 
can the NCS be structured effectively.  
B. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
1. AQD Revision 
The AQD revision in 2013 resulted in a dramatic reduction in NSC 
membership. While the revised AQDs do a better job of defining space 
experience and expertise requirements, the current strength of 197 AD and RC 
officers is not an accurate reflection of space expertise within the Navy officer 
community.202 The low numbers are likely a result of the requirement for 
                                            
199 Department of the Navy, From the Sea to the Stars, 62. 
200 Naval Network Warfare Command, Navy Space Cadre Human Capital Strategy, 17. 
201 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, “Task Force Charter,” 1. 
202 Navy Space Cadre Office, “20140228—SC Office Dashboard v2.” 
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reapplication for all AQDs. The NSC is now in a position that it must recruit new 
members to regrow the community. In the interim, effectiveness of the NSC (not 
to mention fit/fill rates of billets) could suffer substantially.  
2. Space PQS + Minimum Experience 
The Space PQS introduced a single entry point for officers into the NSC. 
For new space acquisition personnel, this is a task to be completed at a 
command with senior VR personnel. The natural junior–senior relationship will be 
present and will encourage mentorship and training on the job. In the space 
operations realm, however, the officers are likely the only space operations 
officers. The question then is: How will the officer complete the PQS? The 
answer must be that he/she studies independently and makes contact with 
NNWC, C10F, or some other space activity by phone or email to complete the 
PQS. Clearly this is not the optimal method of conducting training. The challenge 
of receiving valuable training on the job and through individual study while 
completing the space PQS combined with the lack of formal training or education 
en route to a VS5 billet creates a perfect storm of ineffectiveness. 
The experience requirement prior to applying for the AQD is also a 
significant concern. Once an officer reports for duty in a VS5 billet, he/she must 
wait one year prior to applying for the AQD.203 Thus, for that first year, the billet is 
filled but there is not a fit. The effectiveness of the officer in the role will depend 
greatly on the motivation of the officer, additional tasking (especially relevant 
because space is likely a collateral duty), and the experience he/she gains. In 
space acquisition, the VR1-candidate is a non-fit in the position for two years, as 
he/she gains the experience needed for the AQD, though this is probably less of 
an issue for VR1 billets because there will be more senior space acquisition 
personnel at the command. The assignment of the AQD following experience 
gained at the command also sets a dangerous precedent, particularly in light of 
the low numbers in the NSC currently. Larger and more senior commands 
                                            
203 Chief of Naval Operations, “NAVADMIN 110/13.” 
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requested more senior AQDs (e.g., VS6 at CSGs) during the ZBR billet validation 
process. Since the VS5 AQD is assigned mid-tour, the same may be true for 
VS6–VS8 billets once the new billet base is implemented. This could effectively 
send officers with less experience than requested. Again, this is clearly not the 
most effective means of managing billets.  
The minimum experience requirement also prevents immediate inclusion 
of NPS SSO and SSE graduates in the NSC. These officers return to their 
primary communities without a space-related AQD. Though they carry the 6206P 
or 5500P SSP, they must gain entrance to the NSC through a VS5 or VR1 coded 
billet. This is a potential loss of a significant investment in the education of these 
officers. Furthermore, no VS5 billets are coded with the 6206P SSP. An SSO 
graduate must be detailed first to a VS5 billet and then subsequently to a 6206P-
coded VS6 billet in order to capitalize on the NPS education investment. 
3. Space Operations Rank Structure and Career Progression 
In order to have a sustainable community, the NSC must have sufficient 
junior personnel to promote to senior ranks. The ZBR did not specifically address 
this type of community planning in its manpower validation. Space acquisition 
billets present a natural progression in billets available to junior and senior 
officers (see Figure 5). Space operations billets, on the other hand, are not so 
systematically structured (see Figure 6). While these figures illustrate billets and 
not personnel, it is unlikely that a billet structure such as in Figure 6 can sustain a 
personnel structure required to build the future leaders of the NSC, particularly 
from lieutenant commander to commander. Since not every lieutenant 
commander is promoted to commander, the NSC must structure the billet base to 
support more junior rank members in order to develop sufficient numbers in the 
senior ranks. 
There are two keys to building a sustainable community: knowing the 
target end-strength and knowing (or assuming) an expected promotion/attrition 
rate. The ZBR did not address these matters at all, as it was a manpower study. 
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Personnel from NCF and the OPNAV NSC Office familiar with the ZBR and 
current NSC trends did not have the promotion rate statistics for NSC 
members.204 Promotion rates for NSC members and individual communities are 
necessary for understanding how many junior personnel are needed to develop 
the necessary end-strength at senior ranks. Tracking reassignment rates is also 
important in order to know how often officers are assigned out of their primary 
communities into NSC billets. 
 
Figure 5.  Space acquisition billets by rank.205 
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Figure 6.  Space operations billets by rank.206 
During a recent visit to NPS, the author asked the Navy Space Plan Task 
Force lead how future NSC flag officers, particularly in the operations branch, 
would be developed. She believes officers in the RC are most likely to have the 
desired balance of leadership and space experience needed for future space 
operations flag officers.207 This signifies a corresponding failure to develop senior 
NSC members within the active duty component of the Navy. Leadership in the 
Navy shouldn’t require civilian experience. But the lack of a planned rank 
structure and a viable career path for even a set of space operations officers 
prevents the AD NSC members from seeing a senior NSC position as a career 
possibility, let alone likelihood. Without changes to the rank structure and a viable 
career path, the NSC cannot commit to building its own future space operations 
leaders.  
4. AQD Structure 
An examination of the space operations AQD structure reveals a similar 
development problem. In Figure 7, AD space operations billets are shown, 
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illustrating an increase in VS7 billets over VS6. In a virtual community such as 
the NSC, assignment rates from contributing communities, particularly URL, will 
be fairly low. It is unlikely that a one-for-one development from VS6 to VS7 will 
occur. Furthermore, assignment rate, not just payback completion, is important to 
track in order to develop assumptions on which to base community development. 
 
Figure 7.  AD space operations billets by AQD.208 
The same problem is not manifest in the space acquisition AQD 
breakdown (see Figure 8). In fact, the steep decrease in number of VR2 billets 
compared to VR1 may present an opposite kind of problem. One of the goals of 
the revised AQD structure was to focus space acquisition experience (vice other 
acquisitions experience) in the VR2–VR3 ranks. But the extremely low total of 
VR2 billets unnecessarily limits a potential career path for space acquisition 
officers and forces most officers with space acquisition experience into other 
acquisition jobs, which is ultimately counterproductive.  
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Figure 8.  AD space acquisitions billets by AQD.209 
5. No Space Education Requirement for Space Acquisition 
Professionals 
One effect of the AQD revision is the removal of all formal space 
education and training for space acquisition personnel. The logic from NCF is 
that it is essential for space acquisition professionals to have experience in kind 
for space systems.210 The implication is that buying radios or servers is not the 
same as space systems. It is not essential to have Space 200 or Space 300 at 
predetermined points in the career progression. There is a difference, however, 
between Space 200 not being essential and space education not being essential. 
Space 200 is a mid-career course with two main focuses: development of 
systems and application of space power.211 If the focus on space power 
application is superfluous, a different course (or partial course) can be 
developed. But space education is important for space acquisition professionals. 
In other domains, expertise and education are earned through in-domain 
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experience. For instance, an aviator working with acquisition of aircraft 
components has experience flying in that domain and possibly in that aircraft. 
Most Navy officers do not have similar space systems experience, however. 
While on-the-job training may be a viable solution to this lack of experience 
problem, a course of instruction may be more effective in providing the 
foundational knowledge a space acquisition professional would need. 
To gain in-domain experience, space acquisition professionals need to 
understand the environment the satellite is operating in, the method of launch, 
the composition of the satellite itself, the means of controlling it, the means of 
employing its capabilities, and the threats and vulnerabilities to the system. A 
level of understanding of orbital mechanics and the space environment is 
required to understand the satellite’s physical domain. An understanding of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, satellite communications, and signal processing are 
also required to fully understand the operating domain. Spacecraft are complex 
systems, with propulsion, electrical power generation and distribution, attitude 
determination and control, thermal control, communications subsystems and a 
primary payload, all of which must be understood. While the Space PQS has a 
Fundamentals section requiring signature for all of these topics, formal education 
would provide a deeper level of understanding than individual study. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Navy Space Task Force and follow-on activities are expected to form 
a vision of future requirements for the NSC. Any changes that come will be to the 
existing NSC structure, not a whole revision to the community. Recent theses 
from NPS recommended options for sweeping changes to the NSC. In 2007, 
Paul Bandini and Andrew Dittmer focused their recommendations on operational 
support and streamlined processes. They recommended abandoning satellite 
operations and focusing on S&T addressing Navy requirements while 
consolidating requirements generation within the NRL.212 Redundancies were 
heavily criticized, including NNWC as a coordinating entity for space support to 
deployed naval forces.213 Despite recommending elimination of these roles for 
Navy space, they acknowledged Navy operations require a robust and 
empowered NSC.214 To achieve more effective NSC management, the thesis 
encouraged clarity in Navy space policy and doctrine with unambiguous 
guidance for the community, as well as further integration of space capabilities in 
operational afloat staffs.215 
In 2011, Clint Miller conducted a review of NSC management and found 
that rates of filling billets with personnel (fill rate) and filling billets with qualified 
personnel (fit rate) were insufficient. He recommended three options for the 
overall community. First, formation of a dedicated space cadre designator or 
warfare community would warrant the attention of an entire community and be 
the most effective solution.216 Second, an auxiliary community of “space 
enablers” could fill fleet billets in order to coordinate space support primarily 
                                            
212 Paul V. Bandini and Andrew R. Dittmer, “A Modest Proposal: For Preventing Space 
Operations from Being a Burden to the Navy, and for Making the Space Cadre Beneficial to the 
Community” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 101, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ 
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213 Ibid., 88. 
214 Ibid., 101. 
215 Ibid., 102. 
216 Miller, “Optimizing the Navy’s Investment,” 61. 
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through reach-back tools while the bulk of the traditional NSC billets would be 
filled with NPS-educated officers.217 He recommended a short course for space 
enablers to ensure a basic level of knowledge. Third, he recommended a 
specialty career path for unrestricted line (URL) officers, allowing designated 
officers to continue their community-specific career path while focusing out-of-
community tours in one area.218 
Each of these recommendations is a reasonable method of managing the 
community. But budget limitations and the fact that the Air Force and IC provide 
the preponderance of space capabilities and support forces the author to 
constrain the recommendations of this thesis to those that are likely given the 
current state of the NSC and the standing of Navy space. Three assumptions 
form the foundation of the recommendations. First, the Navy will not create a new 
designator for space professionals. Since its beginning, the Navy has valued 
operational experience across the domains to fill the NSC ranks. Second, most 
new space systems will be developed by entities other than the Navy. Again, 
budget constraints force this realization. Finally, the Navy will continue to 
develop, acquire, and operate the narrowband SATCOM capability.  
A. MANPOWER RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Fully Implement ZBR-Recommended Billet Base 
The ZBR-billet base in combination with the revised AQD structure is a 
dramatic change to the NSC. But the inability to implement the ZBR billet base 
due to funding issues is a significant barrier to an effective NSC. The current 
billet base of 140 billets does not include space operations billets on afloat staffs. 
According to a billet list from the OPNAV Space Cadre office, CSG/ESG billets 
are instead assigned to CVN/LHD ship’s company, primarily as METOC officers. 
Furthermore, C10F has only one billet instead of six. This is particularly 
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significant given the potential C10F MOC has as an enhanced operational space 
coordination capability for deployed Navy assets.  
The recommended billet base also provides additional billets in Navy 
support to joint and Air Force DOD space entities similar to its SSFA billets at 
NRO support IC space programs. The Navy space acquisition presence at the 
MILSATCOM office grows from one to three billets, supporting UHF and EHF 
SATCOM and GPS programs. The Joint Navigation Warfare Center now has two 
VS7 billets, supporting PNT superiority for operations. Ultimately, the future of 
the NSC starts with full implementation of the ZBR-recommended billet base.  
2. Determine Desired End-Strength and Work Backwards 
The Navy Space Plan Task Force is chartered to determine if gaps exist 
between the ZBR-recommended billet base and the future requirements of the 
NSC.219 There is a required step before a gap analysis can be completed: 
determining the future requirement for the NSC and the desired end-strength. 
While the ZBR presented an improved billet base with increased Navy support to 
DOD and joint space entities, it did not address whether these billets adequately 
support the Navy’s future role in space. For instance, the Navy may seek 
responsibility for future weather space system.220 But the recommended billet 
base does not provide billets for DMSP program support. Once future personnel 
and system requirements and desired end-strength are known, the NSC can 
apply assumptions on promotion rates (which it must determine), payback and 
reassignment rates (which it must track), and attrition rates across communities 
to build a billet plan to develop the desired NSC. With this approach, the NSC will 
be more strategically and methodically managed and better positioned to meet 
future Navy needs for space capabilities and expertise. 
                                            
219 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, “Task Force Charter,” 1. 
220 Navy Space Plan Task Force, “Navy Space Plan,” 17. 
 62 
3. Standardize Operational Staff Billets 
The draft Navy Space Plan recommends standardization of space 
operations billets across afloat staffs.221 This is essential to developing effective 
lessons learned and best practices for coordination that can be shared through 
strike group training cycles. Furthermore, standardization must extend to all 
afloat staffs, including assigning VS5 billets to destroyer squadrons (DESRON) 
and future littoral combat ship squadrons (LCSRON). These classes of ships will 
deploy independently and require dedicated space support. While DESRON and 
LCSRON staffs may not provide around the clock support for the deployed units, 
the space operations officers on the staff can act as space mentor for the 
inexperienced ship’s officers during training prior to deployment. Addition of 
DESRON and LCSRON space billets will also increase at-sea billets, an 
important incentive for URL participation in NSC billets.  
The most glaring gap in Navy space support coordination is in-theater. 
The Fleet Space CONOPS identifies that NNWC cannot handle the volume of 
space coordination across the globally deployed forces.222 Each geographic 
combatant command has a DS4 assigned, but the Navy does not have a 
corresponding position. The numbered fleet MOCs are an obvious place to 
designate a Navy space operations coordinator. The ZBR-recommended billet 
base includes VS6 or VS7 billets on all fleet staffs except C5F/NAVCENT. The 
billet base also dramatically increased the C10F space operations billets. The 
NSC must codify, through policy, the relationships between fleet MOCs (including 
the omitted C5F/NAVCENT MOC) and the deployed units they support. Given 
the number of space operations billets slated for C10F, it is the most logical lead 
space coordinating entity for deployed units, allowing numbered fleet space 
operations officers to focus on planning in their respective theaters. The Navy  
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must also consider what the future relationships between FCC/C10F, NNWC, 
and JFCC-Space will be in order to eliminate redundancies and convoluted 
coordination pathways. 
4. Team Space Operations Billets on Afloat Staffs 
The ZBR-recommended billet base moves space operations officers to 
CSG/ESG staffs. But these singular billets should be pairs of billets: a senior and 
a junior. Although space operations officer is a collateral duty and there is not 
likely to be work sufficient to require a shared workload, sharing the experience 
between a senior and a junior is tantamount to building mentor relationships and 
fostering a NSC sub-culture. The senior–junior division could be a literal senior 
officer supervising a junior in the same shop (e.g., N-3). The most effective 
method, however, is to assign a senior AQD (e.g., VS6) in one shop and the 
junior AQD (e.g., VS5) in another. On numbered fleets and CSG/ESGs, the 
senior AQD could be an IDC billet with a URL filling the junior role. This 
arrangement would continue the cross-community sourcing of the NSC while 
giving the IDC an increased leadership role in operational staffs. This would also 
increase sea-duty billets, further encouraging inclusion in URL career 
progression. 
B. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Short Course for VS5 Personnel 
As discussed previously, the Space PQS requires individual study of 
complex topics, possibly without a more experienced NSC member at the 
command to help. This method of training new NSC members will yield 
insufficient depth and non-standardized training for those personnel. The current 
funding challenges will prevent adding a required course as a prerequisite for 
these billets. To ensure adequate depth and standardization of training for new 
space operations officer, a short course should be developed. The Naval Space 
Handbook could serve as a model for an unclassified course, while the Fleet 
Space CONOPS could serve as an introductory classified curriculum. The short 
 64 
course could be added to the fleet training cycle, through Commander, Strike 
Force Training Pacific/Atlantic (CFTP/CFTL) to ensure adequate training prior to 
deployment. Alternatively, a distance-learning course could be developed and 
made available on Navy Knowledge Online (NKO). With  
2. Develop Training Series for VR Personnel 
Space acquisition professionals require space-specific education to be 
effective. In the long-term, the Navy must replace the current NSSI courses with 
its own series of training courses or work with other services to develop an 
acquisition-specific course. In the interim, several short courses can be 
implemented to cover essential topics and delivered through NKO or other 
distance learning methods. 
3. Add VR2 Billets 
The current balance of VR1–VR2 billets does not provide adequate 
opportunities for development of space acquisition experience or career 
progression. In order to sustain sufficient numbers of space acquisition 
professionals with real space acquisition experience, VR2 billets must be 
increased to provide a path for VR1 officers. These billets need not be added, 
simply changed from VR1 to VR2. 
4. Capitalize NPS Graduates 
With the revised AQD structure, NPS graduates are not automatically 
members of the NSC. The NSC is currently undermanned, largely due to the 
AQD revision, and is in need of identified members to fill the ranks. Including 
these officers as members of the NSC, though not truly experienced, is a better 
method of identifying those with space knowledge, whether education or 
experienced based. To capture NPS graduates as NSC members, the Navy 
could waive experience requirements for the first three to five years following 
completion of the SSO or SSE degree. This would allow URL officers to return to 
their community career paths but encourage their payback tour as soon as 
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possible. The experience waiver could expire or require the officer to reapply 
after the designated waiver period ends if the experience requirement is not 
fulfilled.  
5. Develop Career Path 
The NSC human capital strategy emphasized that the NSC does not 
establish a new career path for its members.223 As a virtual community, NSC 
members flow in and out of space billets as available from primary communities. 
But officer availability from primary career paths is not consistent. A career path 
is needed, especially in space operations, to create a sustainable, effective NSC 
capable of growing future senior officers organically. Figure 9 shows IDC billets 
by rank across space operations billets. Compared to the poorly defined rank 
structure in Figure 7, the IDC space operations rank structure is much clearer 
and sustainable.  
Given the relative commitment of the IDC (see Figure 10), overall 
responsibility for NSC management, and existing rank structure, the IDC 
communities should develop career paths for core NSC members (not 
supplemental members from other communities). A viable career progression for 
a significant portion of the virtual community will provide a foundation to build the 
future NSC and limit its vulnerability to inconsistent commitment by other 
communities. This construct would not change the cross-community experience 
base, with IDC members bringing operational experience in the information 
domain and non-IDC members providing other domain experience. Once core 
IDC NSC career paths exist and are shared, other communities can address 
space billets during human capital strategy processes. But the IDC must take the 
lead in addressing the career path problem if changes are to be made. 
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Figure 9.  IDC space billets by rank.224 
 
Figure 10.  Space billets by community.225  
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDED FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The Navy has long used space capabilities to enhance its operations. Its 
legacy of operating and developing systems, participating in DOD and national 
space processes, researching Navy-unique space technologies, and exploiting 
all available space assets provides a blueprint for continued effective use of 
space. The Navy will continue to exploit space assets extensively and effectively 
for the foreseeable future. Measured in these terms, the Navy’s operations in 
space are effective. 
The internal effectiveness and efficiency of the NSC management, 
however, is a different matter altogether. While meeting minimum DOD and DON 
requirements, the NSC has focused on the here-and-now, striving to maintain 
current levels of investment and not growing a sustainable cadre of 
professionals. Since its inception, space cadre leadership has recognized its 
limitations: lack of a defined career path; lack of a defined accession process and 
training progression; lack of a clear vision for the future cadre; and inconsistent 
participation by Navy communities. But recognizing these shortfalls has not led to 
the organizational focus required to address problem areas. The work of the ZBR 
in 2012 and the Navy Space Plan Task Force may force some organizational 
focus. While it is not clear exactly what recommendations the Space Task Force 
will make, it is clear that additional incremental steps must be taken. 
This thesis found that the NSC does meet its responsibilities and that the 
ZBR-recommended billet base will more effectively perform these duties. The 
AQD structure, rank structure, and non-standardized application of the revised 
billets, however, reflect the lack of planned career progressions and may lead to 
an unsustainable billet base. Furthermore, the professional development 
progression for both space operations and space acquisition officers is 
insufficient. While space operations officers receive training at NSSI en route to 
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VS6–VS8 billets, officers in VS5 billets are left to learn on the job and through the 
Space PQS. As the VS5-level officer is likely the only space operations officer at 
their command, this is not likely to produce well-qualified and experienced 
officers. Space acquisition professionals, on the other hand, receive no formal 
space education or training at any level. Finally, the future NSC has not been 
defined, nor considered, in the allocation of NSC billets. Without knowing what is 
expected of the NSC in the future, the effective development of the NSC is 
hampered. The Navy Space Plan Task Force and other Navy space activities 
must consider desired end-strength, promotion rates, attrition rates, and 
reassignment rates in order to build the future NSC. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Manning Review 
The dynamic state of NSC manning, particularly due to the AQD revision, 
prevented a full analysis of NSC personnel management. Once the NSC ranks 
have filled out with officers awarded the revised AQDs, a manning study of fit 
rates, fill rates, reassignment rates, and examination of payback tours will 
provide useful insight into the effectiveness of the NSC virtual community. 
2. Analysis of USMC Space Cadre 
The Marine Corps does not acquire or develop space systems, but it does 
require space capabilities in its operations. The Marine Corps space cadre 
includes dedicated space operations officers and space operations staff officers. 
The space operations officers focus on Marine Corps participation in national 
space processes while staff officers focus on operational commands and support 
to the warfighter.226 This could prove to be an effective model for improved 
operational support for deployed units. 
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